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Historically, dissolutions of currency unions are not unusual. I use an annual panel data set 
covering 245 country pairs that use a common currency (of which 128 are dissolved) from 
1948 through 1997 to characterize currency union exits. I find that departures from a currency 
union tend to occur when there is a large inflation differential between member countries, 
when the currency union involves a country which is closed to international trade and trade 
flows dry up, and when there is a change in the political status of a member. In general, 
however, macroeconomic factors have only little predictive power for currency union 
dissolutions. 
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I. Introduction 
In recent years, monetary integration has become fashionable again. Twelve European 
countries have formed a monetary union, giving up their national currencies for the euro. 
Other countries have dollarized, adopting the currency of another country on a unilateral 
basis. After some decades in which almost all countries, except for some small and 
geographically remote territories, strongly preferred to have their own monies, more than two-
thirds of the sovereign countries in the world are either considering to abandon their national 
money or already have done so.
1 
One of the main reasons for the countries’ growing willingness to enter a currency 
union is the credibility of these arrangements. In contrast to other hard currency pegs (such as 
fixed exchange rates or currency boards), the abandonment of a country’s own currency is 
often assumed to be permanent; it cannot be easily reversed and, thus, appears to be a more 
serious commitment than any other fixed-rate regime. For Europeans, the use of a common 
currency implies a degree of integration that goes much beyond the elimination of exchange 
rate volatility. For dollarized countries, the adoption of another country’s currency means that 
monetary policy is delegated directly to a foreign authority. 
Historically, however, dissolutions of currency unions are not unusual. Reuven Glick 
and Andrew Rose (2002) even find that for the period from 1948 through 1997 currency 
union exits clearly outnumber currency union entries. Of the 146 regime transitions (for 
which they have data), there were 130 switches out of but only 16 switches into currency 
unions. 
In this paper, I examine why some monetary unions fall apart, while others remain in 
existence for a long period of time. In particular, I ask when does a country leave a currency 
union. By comparing the behavior of countries in currency unions shortly before their 
dissolution with that of sustained currency unions, I am able to identify potential causes of 
                                                 
1 Alberto Alesina and Robert Barro (2001, p. 381) note that “roughly 60 small countries or 
territories [of the 193 independent countries] have for some time been members of currency 
unions or have used a large country’s money”, including the 15-member CFA franc zone in 
Africa and the 7-member Eastern Caribbean Currency Area. In terms of GDP, however, this 
group of countries (excluding anchor countries) makes up less than 1 percent of world GDP. 
If one adds to this list the 12-member European Monetary Union, the accession countries in 
Europe, the countries in West Africa, Southern Africa and the Arab Gulf region that have 
declared their intention to form a currency union as well as the Latin American countries that 
seriously consider dollarization, the number of countries without a national currency is easily 
doubled and the combined GDP is increased by several orders of magnitude. 
1 
currency union break-ups.
2 My empirical results suggest that departures from a currency 
union tend to occur when there is a large inflation differential between member countries, 
when the currency union involves a country which is relatively closed to international trade 
and trade flows fall, and when there is a change in political status of a member. In general, 
however, macroeconomic factors have only little predictive power for currency union 
dissolutions. 
This paper adds to an already large and again rapidly growing literature on currency 
unions. Most of the recent (empirical) studies, however, explore the degree of integration in 
currency unions relative to countries with different national monies. Rose and Charles Engel 
(2002), for instance, measure several economic characteristics for currency union members 
and compare them to non-currency union countries. Alesina, Barro and Silvana Tenreyro 
(2002) rank country pairs by their degree of integration and attempt to identify optimal 
currency areas. Here, however, I focus exclusively on existing currency unions which then 
may or may not have been sustained; countries with separate currencies are ignored. 
This paper is also related (and close in style) to the rich empirical literature on the 
determinants of changes in exchange rate regimes. Turbulences in foreign exchange markets 
(like regime transitions and currency crashes) have attracted much attention, and numerous 
studies attempt to link these episodes to macroeconomic and political variables. Examples 
include Barry Eichengreen, Rose and Charles Wyplosz (1995), Jeffrey Frankel and Rose 
(1996), and Graciela Kaminsky and Carmen Reinhart (1999); Kaminsky, Saul Lizondo and 
Reinhart (1998) provide a survey. To my knowledge, however, there is no study that focuses 
on the break-ups of currency unions. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section provides some analytical 
background. I then describe the data and their characteristics, followed by a presentation of 
the results of multivariate analyses. After presenting some more illustrative details, the paper 
ends with a brief summary. 
 
II. Background 
In order to determine factors that may help to explain why countries leave a currency 
union, the large theoretical literature on fixed exchange rates offers at least two different 
analytical frameworks. The first is based on Robert Mundell’s (1961) concept of an “optimum 
currency area”. This concept emphasizes the costs and benefits of monetary integration and 
                                                 
2 In future work, I intend to explore the (short-term) macroeconomic effects of currency union 
dissolutions. 
2 
argues that the (net) gains from sharing a single currency increase with the degree of 
economic integration. The dissolution of a currency union can then be viewed as evidence that 
the members were not part of an optimum currency area; the benefits of using the same 
money (e.g., lower transaction costs in trading goods and services) were (ex post) smaller than 
the costs (e.g., the loss of an independent monetary policy). In empirical work, typically four 
criteria (or a subset) are examined to identify an optimum currency area: the intensity of trade, 
the symmetry of shocks and cycles, the degree of labor mobility, and the mechanism of fiscal 
transfers. For dissolved currency unions then, I would expect to find, based on these criteria, a 
lower degree of integration than for sustained unions. 
The alternative framework is provided by the literature on currency crises and 
speculative attacks. The idea here is that a country may be forced to leave a currency union 
even if the currency union members generally exhibit the desirable degree of economic 
integration. Of course, the credibility of the commitment to use the same money makes 
members of a currency union less vulnerable (and maybe even immune) to a speculative 
attack. However, similar to other fixed exchange rate arrangements, inconsistencies between 
domestic economic fundamentals and the exchange rate commitment may arise. Poor policies, 
for instance, can rapidly increase the costs of monetary integration so that, at some point, a 
country may decide that it is no longer willing to bear these costs; Roberto Chang and Andrés 
Velasco (2002) provide a recent formalization of this time inconsistency problem. To identify 
empirically when a currency link becomes unsustainable, the literature on currency crises has 
used a large variety of indicators; Kaminsky et al.’s (1998) summary of 28 selected studies 
lists alone 105 indicators.
3 It follows that also a much broader set of macroeconomic and 
financial variables may be relevant in explaining currency union break-ups. 
A third (intuitively plausible) view is that currency union dissolutions are mainly the 
result of changes in the political status of a territory; many departures from a currency union 
link indeed occurred when a colony gained independence and subsequently left the currency 
area of the former colonizer.
4 Most recently, the break-up of federations in Eastern Europe 
(the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia) has illustrated the importance of political ties 
for monetary integration; the dissolution of the political union was also accompanied by a 
                                                 
3 Kaminsky et al. (1998, p. 2) conclude: “The results indicate that an effective warning system 
[of currency crises] should consider a broad variety of indicators, since currency crises seem 
to usually be preceded by a broad range of economic problems.” 
4 William Bomberger (2002) argues that the decline in trade after currency union dissolution 
is mainly the result of a reorientation of trade flows after former colonies gained 
independence rather than reflecting the change in the currency union status. 
3 
dissolution of the monetary union.
 5 This view then implies that currency union exits are 
largely unrelated to economic fundamentals. 
In the empirical analysis, I try to account for these different explanations. Based on the 
literature on optimum currency areas, I examine the intensity of the ties between currency 
union members. In particular, I enter explanatory variables not only in absolute levels or rates 
of change (reflecting the economic conditions in a country) but also relative to the same 
variable in a partner country using the same currency; this allows to identify the effect of 
asymmetries and differentials on the likelihood of currency union break-up. Similar to other 
empirical studies on transitions in the exchange rate regime, I also explore the impact of a 
wide range of potential indicators. The list of variables can be broadly grouped into five 
categories and also includes a measure of change in the political status; the remaining groups 
are: 1) macroeconomic indicators; 2) financial variables; 3) fiscal measures; and 4) openness 
variables. The next section describes the data set in more detail. 
 
III. Data 
The data used in this paper come essentially from two sources. Most of the data are 
obtained from Glick and Rose (2002); they have compiled a data set of macroeconomic 
variables for 217 countries and territories, covering the period from 1948 through 1997 on an 
annual basis. This data set has, for my purposes, several useful features. First, it is extremely 
comprehensive; the data set covers most of the post-war period and virtually all political 
entities in the world (i.e., countries, territories, colonies, dependencies and so on). Assembled 
in pairwise form, it comprises more than 400,000 observations although there are many 
observations missing.
6 Second, the data are extracted from standard sources such as the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators or the IMF’s International Financial Statistics; they 
have been checked and corrected for mistakes. Finally, and most notably, the data set contains 
information on whether a pair of countries shares the same currency. Based on this currency 
union dummy, I construct a binary variable for a break-up of the currency union in the 
following year that will serve as regressand in my analysis (as a robustness check, I also 
construct a dummy variable for currency union break-up in one of the following three years). 
More details are discussed in Glick and Rose (2002). 
                                                 
5 As Charles Goodhart (1995, p. 449) puts it: “Political, not economic, events have caused the 
monetary changes in Central and Eastern Europe; economic considerations, although 
important, have been secondary.” 
6 For instance, Glick and Rose’s sample includes only observations for country pairs with 
positive bilateral trade. 
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5 
In the actual implementation, I extract a subset from this large panel data set, 
containing the observations of currency union pairs. This leaves 4,625 observations for 245 
currency unions (or, more precisely, country pairs in a currency union) of which 128 are 
dissolved during the sample period; the currency unions and the exits are tabulated in the 
appendix. Figure 1 displays the distribution of observations over time. While the number of 
observations has a slight tendency to increase over time (mostly due to a better availability of 
data), currency union exits most often occured in the 1960s and 1970s
7; some of these 
currency union dissolutions are related so that the observations probably should not be treated 
as independent observations. 
To this data set, I add a number of other macroeconomic and financial variables, taken 
from Rose and Engel (2002). This data set covers a broad set of indicators typically employed 
in empirical studies on currency crises. Rose and Engel have used these variables to 
characterize currency unions, I utilize them to characterize currency union exits. In particular, 
I apply all of their macroeconomic, financial, fiscal and openness variables.
8 The exact list of 




4.1 Univariate Evidence 
In table 1, I report separate means and standard deviations for sustained currency 
unions (defined to exist for at least the next three years) and dissolved currency union links
9; 
this allows to compare (in univariate fashion) the average behavior of the variable of interest 
for broken and non-broken currency unions. I also include a p-value for a t-test of equality of 
means; differences in means that are statistically significant at the 5 percent level are in bold. 
                                                 
7 None of the results changes when the analysis is confined to this period. 
8 I ignore their measures of educational attainment and geographic remoteness. 
9 For broken currency union links, I tabulate the results for the period up to three years prior 
the break and the (one) year immediately preceding the break. The motivation is that an exit 
from a currency union (i.e., the introduction and circulation of a country’s own new national 
money) may require some time for preparations (e.g., the establishment of a central bank, the 
design and printing of banknotes). Therefore, economic conditions a few years before a 
currency union dissolution may be more relevant in explaining this event than the situation 
shortly before the break. As shown in the table, however, there are only minor differences in 
the results. 
6Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Obs. Obs. Mean Obs. Mean
A. Macroeconomic Variables
Real GDP Growth (%)
minimum, pair-wise 2603 0.5 8.2 237 0.3 5.8 0.77 83 -1.3 6.5 0.05
difference, pair-wise 2603 7.4 10.6 237 8.8 14.2 0.05 83 8.4 6.5 0.36
Real GDP per Capita ($)
minimum, pair-wise 1036 1818 2710 20 1554 764 0.66 10 1359 689 0.59
difference, pair-wise 1036 1495 2568 20 4386 6171 0.00 10 3243 5807 0.04
Private Consumption Growth (%)
minimum, pair-wise 1603 -1.8 8.5 115 -1.3 7.0 0.47 45 -2.0 6.8 0.93
difference, pair-wise 1603 10.3 10.9 115 10.0 8.8 0.78 45 13.8 10.5 0.04
Total Consumption Growth (%)
minimum, pair-wise 1510 -1.3 7.1 64 -1.1 7.0 0.82 25 -2.5 7.6 0.40
difference, pair-wise 1510 8.9 9.0 64 10.2 7.6 0.24 25 13.7 8.5 0.01
Inflation (%)
maximum, pair-wise 1419 9.1 8.2 129 12.3 14.7 0.00 45 16.6 22.1 0.00
difference, pair-wise 1419 4.5 4.5 129 7.1 13.5 0.00 45 11.0 21.2 0.00
B. Financial Variables
M2/GDP (%)
maximum, pair-wise 1558 31.1 16.5 51 31.7 16.7 0.80 22 33.4 16.4 0.51
difference, pair-wise 1558 8.8 8.3 51 12.1 13.2 0.01 22 12.8 12.8 0.03
M2/GDP Growth (%)
minimum, pair-wise 1398 -2.8 8.2 41 -3.7 9.4 0.49 13 -3.7 14.4 0.71
difference, pair-wise 1398 9.7 9.0 41 8.8 9.6 0.54 13 13.8 14.4 0.10
Interest Rate Spread (%)
maximum, pair-wise 956 5.0 4.4 12 5.1 4.6 0.99 5 4.8 4.3 0.91
difference, pair-wise 956 1.3 1.5 12 3.4 3.0 0.00 5 3.3 2.2 0.00
Credit to Private Sector (%GDP)
maximum, pair-wise 1586 31.9 18.2 60 37.7 23.2 0.02 28 37.7 23.2 0.09
difference, pair-wise 1586 12.4 12.9 60 19.5 18.5 0.00 28 20.6 18.6 0.00
Credit to Priv. Sector Growth (%)
minimum, pair-wise 1425 -6.3 14.1 45 -2.9 12.0 0.11 15 -5.7 14.8 0.89
difference, pair-wise 1425 14.8 14.2 45 26.1 94.0 0.00 15 59.7 160 0.00
Domestic Banking Credit (%GDP)
maximum, pair-wise 1584 37.9 23.0 60 45.8 27.2 0.01 28 47.2 26.7 0.04
difference, pair-wise 1584 15.2 22.0 60 20.5 22.2 0.07 28 23.1 22.9 0.06
Dom. Banking Credit Growth (%)
minimum, pair-wise 1423 -5.3 13.1 45 -3.1 16.6 0.27 15 -6.2 24.2 0.77
difference, pair-wise 1423 17.7 19.2 45 29.1 75.0 0.00 15 54.0 128 0.00
C. Fiscal Variables
Current Revenue (%GDP)
maximum, pair-wise 302 23.7 6.9 22 22.7 6.5 0.53 5 23.0 6.7 0.83
difference, pair-wise 302 7.6 5.8 22 6.7 5.5 0.47 5 6.2 5.2 0.59
Tax Revenue (%GDP)
maximum, pair-wise 353 20.1 4.7 25 20.0 5.0 0.88 6 20.2 5.3 0.97
difference, pair-wise 353 5.5 4.3 25 6.0 3.7 0.60 6 5.9 3.7 0.84
Trade Taxes (%Revenues)
maximum, pair-wise 340 38.8 12.8 34 34.2 14.0 0.05 10 34.0 15.3 0.25






Sustained Three Years Before Break One Year Before Break
Std.
Test of Test of
Equal. Equal.
7Table 1 continued
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean
C. Fiscal Variables (continued)
Expenditures (%GDP)
maximum, pair-wise 313 30.0 8.9 18 30.9 8.6 0.68 6 32.5 11.4 0.50
difference, pair-wise 313 10.0 8.3 18 10.6 5.6 0.78 6 12.9 6.7 0.39
Budget Deficit (%GDP)
maximum, pair-wise 286 -0.8 2.3 18 -2.1 2.5 0.03 6 -1.2 2.6 0.70
difference, pair-wise 286 4.9 5.5 18 2.7 1.7 0.09 6 3.6 1.4 0.56
Central Government Debt (%GDP)
maximum, pair-wise 61 47.8 34.2 7 23.4 15.9 0.07 3 29.9 8.5 0.37
difference, pair-wise 61 20.7 25.4 7 8.9 6.4 0.23 3 14.1 5.4 0.65
D. Openness Variables
Current Account (%GDP)
minimum, pair-wise 1188 -11.4 9.6 36 -9.0 5.2 0.14 15 -7.6 5.2 0.13
difference, pair-wise 1188 7.9 9.2 36 5.2 3.8 0.08 15 5.3 4.2 0.27
Exports/GDP (%)
maximum, pair-wise 1971 39.1 16.3 151 36.5 19.4 0.05 58 34.7 17.7 0.04
difference, pair-wise 1971 16.9 13.7 151 18.3 14.8 0.22 58 16.9 14.0 0.99
Export Growth (%)
minimum, pair-wise 1442 -3.5 12.2 63 -4.8 13.7 0.42 25 -11.6 14.0 0.00
difference, pair-wise 1442 17.5 17.4 63 21.4 23.7 0.09 25 27.8 26.4 0.00
Export Duties (%Exports)
maximum, pair-wise 280 4.3 3.2 19 15.7 14.4 0.00 4 23.5 12.4 0.00
difference, pair-wise 280 2.6 2.9 19 13.1 13.5 0.00 4 18.6 11.0 0.00
Imports/GDP (%)
maximum, pair-wise 1971 46.0 20.3 151 39.4 20.5 0.00 58 38.0 19.0 0.00
difference, pair-wise 1971 16.0 16.2 151 17.2 16.0 0.39 58 16.6 14.9 0.78
Import Growth (%)
minimum, pair-wise 1442 -4.0 11.4 63 -7.1 15.0 0.03 25 -15.6 17.7 0.00
difference, pair-wise 1442 16.0 15.6 63 26.3 24.8 0.00 25 31.4 20.6 0.00
Import Duties (%Imports)
maximum, pair-wise 326 22.2 7.0 30 15.1 6.5 0.00 8 11.7 6.3 0.00
difference, pair-wise 326 8.5 6.9 30 6.1 4.9 0.07 8 6.9 6.9 0.52
Trade/GDP (%)
maximum, pair-wise 1011 38.7 44.6 20 26.0 18.3 0.21 10 21.8 7.7 0.23
difference, pair-wise 1011 21.7 41.0 20 13.2 17.7 0.36 10 9.2 7.3 0.34
Gross FDI (%GDP)
maximum, pair-wise 859 2.0 3.0 20 1.0 0.7 0.14 10 0.7 0.5 0.18
difference, pair-wise 859 1.4 2.4 20 0.9 0.6 0.37 10 0.6 0.4 0.30
Gross Private Capital Flows (%GDP)
maximum, pair-wise 865 17.4 43.6 20 10.0 5.2 0.44 10 8.4 3.9 0.51
difference, pair-wise 865 12.5 43.1 20 4.2 4.0 0.39 10 4.2 4.0 0.54
Bilateral Trade Growth (%) 3393 1.2 26.3 289 -0.7 12.3 0.22 102 -1.2 18.5 0.37
E. Institutional Variable
Change in Political Union
Dummy 3531 0.01 0.12 301 0.05 0.22 0.00 105 0.05 0.21 0.00
Notes: "Sustained" currency unions are defined to exist for at least the following three years. The p-values refer to a 
comparison of means between broken and sustained unions; differences significant at the 5% level are in bold.
(p-val.) Dev. (p-val.)
Sustained Three Years Before Break One Year Before Break
Obs. Mean Dev. Dev.
Test of Test of
Std. Std. Equal. Std. Equal.
8 
I begin with macroeconomic variables. The first two lines of table 1 display the results 
for real GDP growth. They show that the minimum growth rate
10 for each country pair 
averages about 0.5 percent for a typical (sustained) currency union, is on average only slightly 
below this level (0.3 percent) in the three years before a currency union dissolution, but falls 
to –1.3 percent in the year immediately preceding the break. The results also indicate that a 
currency union exit is often preceded by a (negative) idiosyncratic shock to one of the 
members. Broken currency unions display a considerably larger difference in pair-wise 
growth rates than sustained currency unions (although the deviation just misses statistical 
significance at the 5 percent level). This is consistent with the literature on optimum currency 
areas where countries whose business cycles are imperfectly synchronized with others’ 
benefit the most from the potential stabilization of a national monetary policy. 
The results for other macroeconomic variables confirm this finding. Broken currency 
unions are characterized by a particularly large difference in the members’ GDP per capita; 
this differential is a crude indication of a large asymmetry in shocks and cycles, but may also 
support the hypothesis that many currency union exits followed decolonization. Also 
consumption growth varies widely in dissolved currency unions shortly before the break. 
The most convincing piece of evidence, however, is the economically and statistically 
large difference in the behavior of inflation between sustained and broken currency unions. 
Country pairs in dissolved currency unions tend to have a much higher rate of inflation and 
display also a much larger difference in inflation rates than country pairs in sustained 
currency unions. Moreover, the deviation from a typical currency union pair seems to 
accelerate during the run-up to the currency union break. The average (maximum) rate of 
inflation increases from 12.3 percent in the three years before a break to 16.6 percent 
immediately before the break (compared with 9.1 percent in tranquil, non-break periods); the 
inflation differential rises from 7.1 to 11 percentage points (compared with 4.5 percentage 
points in periods of tranquillity). 
Next, I consider financial variables; these variables often feature prominently in 
studies of banking and exchange rate crises (see, for instance, Kaminsky and Reinhart 
[1999]). Most of the measures show statistically significant differences across financial 
systems in dissolved currency unions relative to sustained ones. For instance, the ratio of M2 
to GDP, a measure of financial depth, varies by about 12 percentage points in the run-up to a 
regime switch compared with an average of less than 9 percentage points in sustained 
                                                 
10 The minimum growth rate is the lower value in GDP growth for each country pair/year 
observation. 
9 
currency unions. There is no clear evidence, however, that the absolute values of these 
variables (neither in levels nor in growth rates) differ substantially across broken and 
sustained currency unions. While banking and exchange rate crises have been typically linked 
to rapid growth in credit and monetary aggregates, there is no measurable difference in the 
M2 to GDP ratio (or its growth rate), and also the interest rate spread (defined as the lending 
rate minus LIBOR) is no different (although this result may suffer from the small number of 
observations). The exceptions are the credit measures which show a pattern consistent with 
the theory; dissolved currency unions tend to involve countries with a particularly large 
domestic credit/GDP ratio (well above the ratio recorded for tranquil periods) so that the 
dissolution of the currency link may be the result of a boom (and bust cycle) in domestic 
lending. 
For fiscal measures, I can only rarely reject the null of no difference in the behavior of 
these variables between countries that keep a currency union link and countries that depart 
from a common currency, but (again) many observations are missing. The only notable 
difference is in budget deficits; countries that leave a currency union tend to have less 
budgetary discipline. 
Turning to openness indicators, there are at least three noteworthy observations. First, 
the behavior of current account balances does not vary substantially between broken and 
sustained currency unions
11; if anything, the current account deficits are smaller before a 
break and there are smaller differences in pair-wise current account balances. Second, 
countries in dissolved currency unions tend to be less open (as measured by both the exports-
to-GDP and the imports-to-GDP ratios), and they also experience a considerable decline in 
trade prior the break (as measured by both exports and imports growth). This decline in trade, 
however, is mostly confined to one of the currency union members; there is a large 
differential in trade growth across broken currency unions. There is also no significant decline 
in bilateral trade. Third, countries that exit a currency union receive on average smaller capital 
inflows (relative to GDP), but the difference to tranquil periods is not statistically significant. 
Finally, a measure refers to the decolonization hypothesis that (in the past) currency 
union dissolutions mainly occurred when a colony gained independence and subsequently left 
the currency area of its former colonizer. As shown in the table, there is some evidence for the 
intuition. The mean of a dummy on a change in political status is larger for dissolved currency 
unions than for sustained ones and the difference is statistically highly significant. The 
                                                 
11 Eichengreen et al. (1995) report similar findings for currency crises. 
10 
average value of 0.05, however, indicates that switches in political status preceded only about 
one-twentieth of the exchange rate regime transitions in the sample.
12 
 
4.2 Multivariate Results 
The preceding comparisons are univariate. I now turn to multivariate analysis. More 
precisely, I estimate multinomial logit models (by maximum likelihood), linking a binary 
variable of currency union dissolution to a set of explanatory regressors. As noted above, I 
employ two measures of currency union exit: a binary variable which is defined as unity if the 
currency union link is dissolved in the following year (and zero otherwise), and a binary 
variable which is defined as unity if the link is broken in one of the next three years. 
My exact empirical strategy is dictated by the limited availability of macroeconomic 
data which often reduces the number of usable observations. Combining the effects of the 
variables together into a single model would reduce sample size dramatically. Therefore, I 
apply a two-step procedure. 
In a first step, I estimate a baseline regression that includes only a small set of 
potentially important explanatory variables. In particular, I use as standard regressors: GDP 
growth, inflation, bilateral trade growth and change in political union. This specification is not 
the result of extensive pre-testing. Rather, it ensures that, on the one hand, a broad range of 
potential explanations for the break-up of currency unions is covered, while, on the other 
hand, the cost of lost observations is minimized. In a later stage, I add the remaining variables 
to this fixed set of controls, one at a time.
13 
The benchmark results are reported in the first column of table 2. Results are tabulated 
for a currency union dissolution in the following year; results are similar for a break in the 
following three years. Since logit coefficients are not easily interpretable, I am particularly 
interested in the direction of the link. Associated z-statistics which test the null hypothesis of 
no effect are in brackets. 
The estimates are not especially encouraging in the sense that there do not appear to be 
tight links between currency union dissolutions and their posited determinants. As shown, 
only one variable has a statistically significant coefficient, the pair-wise difference in 
inflation. The positive coefficient implies that a large difference in inflation performance 
                                                 
12 Another promising approach would be to divide the sample of currency unions by the 
reasons for their initial adoption. One would expect that economic factors primarily explain 
the dissolution of voluntarily adopted currency unions, while political factors may be of 
overwhelming importance for the break-up of colonial and federal country currency unions. I 
am grateful to Charles Goodhart for pointing this out to me. 
11Table 2: Baseline Results
(1) (2) (3)
Real GDP Growth, minimum  -0.039  -0.027#
(-1.614) (-1.798)
Real GDP Growth, difference    0.014    0.001
  (0.807)   (0.082)
Inflation, maximum    0.014    0.018
  (0.721)   (0.939)
Inflation, difference    0.094**    0.074**
  (3.006)   (2.611)
Bilateral Trade Growth  -0.001  -0.003  -0.001
(-0.137) (-0.838) (-0.211)
Change in Political Union, dummy    0.404    0.993#    0.455
  (0.384)   (1.855)   (0.439)
# of observations 1449 2840 1548
McFadden R
2 0.06 0.01 0.06
Notes: Multinomial logit estimation. z-statistics are in parentheses. Constant not reported.
Explanatory variables refer to the year before the currency union dissolution.
**, * and # denote significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
12 
across currency union members is associated with a significant increase the likelihood of a 
currency union dissolution, holding all else constant.
14 All the other variables have correctly 
signed, but insignificant coefficients, though some (like the minimum GDP growth rate) are 
close to significance. This somewhat weak result is not too surprising, however, given the 
large number of failed attempts to link exchange rates (in general) and currency crises (in 
particular) to macroeconomic fundamentals. Eichengreen et al. (1995, pp. 254-55), for 
instance, summarize their detailed analysis of causes and consequences of foreign exchange 
market turbulences by noting that “regime transitions such as exchange rate flotations … are 
difficult to distinguish systematically from periods of tranquillity … [so that] … there do not 
appear to be clear early warning signals which precede changes in exchange rate regimes.” 
In the remaining columns of table 2, I report the results of two alternative 
specifications. Dropping the inflation measures almost doubles the number of observations 
and (slightly) raises the statistical significance of the coefficients on real GDP growth and on 
a change in political union, but the coefficients remain insignificant on the conventional 5 
percent level of confidence. The benchmark results are basically unaffected when measures of 
GDP growth are dropped. 
Table 3 performs the extensions. In the upper half of the table, I report the results for 
the baseline variables. More specifically, I tabulate the range of the estimated coefficients, the 
maximum/minimum absolute value of the z-statistics and the number of times in which the 
coefficient enters a regression statistically significantly (at the 5 percent level). 
Although the estimates vary substantially across specifications, the results are 
generally reassuring. As before, the inflation differential has the most precisely estimated 
impact on the likelihood of a currency union dissolution; a large difference in inflation 
performance is consistently strongly and significantly associated with the incidence of a 
currency union break.
15 In some specifications, also other baseline variables have significant 
coefficients, most notably the dummy on a change in political union (which enters 
significantly in about one-fourth of the regressions).
16 Thus, there is some evidence that a split 
in political union is often quickly followed by currency union dissolution. 
In the lower half of the table, the results for the other (additionally entered) variables 
are shown. Broadly, the results from univariate analyses are confirmed. The coefficients on 
                                                                                                                                                         
13 Grace Juhn and Paolo Mauro (2002) follow a similar approach. 
14 Barro (1996, pp. 65-68) argues that prior colonial status (by colonizer) may be an useful 
instrument for inflation. 
15 The inflation differential is the only baseline variable that does not change sign in any of 
the perturbations. 
13 
per capita income take on the expected sign but just miss statistical significance. Similarly 
financial measures are often just little below conventional significance levels; only a large 
difference in the interest rate spread is significantly associated with a higher probability of a 
currency union, perhaps in anticipation of this event. Fiscal measures are, as before, mostly 
insignificant (including the budget deficit), while a small degree of openness (especially in 
one of the countries) and low trade growth both coincide with an increased probability of a 
currency union dissolution. 
To summarize, with the possible exception of inflation differentials, there are only few 
clearly significant links between macroeconomic fundamentals and currency union 
dissolutions.
17 On the positive side, trade openness appears to matter. Currency unions that 
include countries which trade only very little (as a share of GDP) are likely to dissolve, 
especially at a time when the countries experience a decline in external trade.
18 Also changes 
in political status appear to be important; a break-up in political union is often accompanied 
by a break-up of the currency link. On the negative side, there is little evidence that the co-
movement of output and the symmetry of shocks has a measurable effect on the sustainability 
of a currency union. Similarly, fiscal aspects that play an important role in the design of the 
European Monetary Union (in the form of the stability and growth pact) have no predictive 
power for currency union dissolution. 
 
V. More Details 
The previous results are derived from a large sample of very diverse experiences. For 
many economic variables, differences between broken and sustained currency unions are 
masked by large variances; economic conditions often vary considerably across currency 
union break-ups.
19 In this section, I therefore present some more illustrative details of the data 
set. 
                                                                                                                                                         
16 If significant, coefficients have the expected sign. 
17 I have performed extensive robustness checks. For instance, I have: used probit models; 
split the sample into pre- and post-1975; excluded politically motivated currency union break-
ups (i.e., when a colony gained independence); and distinguished between membership in 
bilateral and multilateral arrangements. In all of these cases, the estimates were basically 
identical with the baseline results. As expected, economic factors appear to be somewhat 
stronger for currency union dissolutions unrelated to political events, and multilateral 
arrangements seem to be more robust. There is also some evidence that the (pair-wise) 
minimum GDP growth rate might have an effect. 
18 Additionally controlling for country size has no measurable effect. 
19 This result basically confirms the findings of Benjamin Cohen (2001). After examining 
seven case studies, Cohen concludes (similar to Goodhart) that economic variables (or 
organizational characteristics) are only second order issues; the sustainability of currency 
14Table 3: Extensions
max. min. max. min. number
Baseline Variables coeff. coeff. |z|-stat. |z|-stat. significant
Real GDP Growth 0.024 -1.169 2.47 0.12 5
0.103 -0.229 2.62 0.01 2
Inflation 0.423 -0.049 2.31 0.03 3
0.455 0.036 3.03 0.29 15
Bilateral Trade Growth 0.015 -0.061 1.01 0.03 0
Change in Political Union 6.218 -33.035 3.10 0.00 6
McFadden number number
Additional Variables coeff. z-stat. R
2 obs. cu breaks
A. Macroeconomic Variables
Real GDP per Capita -0.009 -1.87 0.82 695 6
0.002 1.86
Private Consumption Growth 0.003 0.07 0.11 1104 25
-0.053 -1.81
Total Consumption Growth 0.041 0.86 0.20 941 15
-0.027 -0.74
B. Financial Variables
M2/GDP 0.040 1.68 0.20 1071 14
0.038 1.22
M2/GDP Growth 0.060 1.53 0.09 972 9
-0.002 -0.04
Interest Rate Spread -0.058 -0.46 0.13 682 4
0.440 2.30
Credit to Private Sector 0.002 0.09 0.13 1100 18
0.041 1.66
Credit to Priv. Sector Growth 0.011 0.57 0.10 999 11
0.013 1.83
Domestic Banking Credit 0.019 1.27 0.11 1099 18
0.011 0.56
Dom. Banking Credit Growth 0.003 0.14 0.10 997 11
0.014 2.25
C. Fiscal Variables
Current Revenue 0.097 1.08 0.14 265 4
-0.197 -1.37
Tax Revenue 0.031 0.29 0.12 315 5
-0.044 -0.33
Trade Taxes -0.246 -2.42 0.29 303 7
0.209 2.18
Expenditures 0.066 0.85 0.20 285 5
0.035 0.47
Budget Deficit -0.100 -0.43 0.20 261 5
0.001 0.01









































Additional Variables coeff. z-stat. R
2 obs. cu breaks
D. Openness Variables
Current Account 0.007 0.10 0.39 846 10
-0.226 -1.93
Exports/GDP -0.041 -2.13 0.10 1273 32
0.025 1.17
Export Growth -0.037 -1.70 0.18 953 14
-0.013 -0.72
Export Duties 0.245 1.77 0.51 291 4
-0.070 -0.50
Imports/GDP -0.078 -3.66 0.14 1273 32
0.083 3.84
Import Growth -0.065 -2.16 0.23 953 14
0.020 1.35
Import Duties -0.488 -2.66 0.36 279 6
0.373 2.11
Trade/GDP -0.017 -0.19 0.59 677 6
-0.148 -1.31
Gross FDI -0.548 -0.28 0.51 612 6
0.490 0.24
Gross Private Capital Flows 0.156 0.68 0.65 616 6
-0.887 -1.69
Notes: Multinomial logit estimation. The six baseline variables (and an unreported constant) are included in all
regressions. Additional variables are (pair-wise) entered as seventh/eigth regressor; coefficients significant at
the 5% level are in bold. For the baseline variables the minimum and maximum absolute values of the z statistic
in any of the regressions are reported, and the number of cases in which the variable is significant at the 5% level.






















A large fraction of the currency unions in the sample are country pairs in which a 
dependent territory uses the currency of the colonizing country; these currency union links 
were often dissolved after the colonies gained independence. However, while many of these 
countries established a national central bank immediately after (or even before) independence, 
the date when the peg was given up varies markedly. Figure 2 plots a histogram of the time 
period between political independence and currency union exit. Excluding transitive cases, the 
sample comprises 69 currency union dissolutions. Of these 69 exits, four involve still existing 
dependencies (Bermuda, Djibouti, Reunion, St. Pierre et Miquelon); another five links were 
dissolved before the territory gained independence (The Bahamas, Brunei Darussalam, Qatar, 
Vanuatu, Zimbabwe). The remaining 60 cases spread over time, with about two-thirds of the 
exits (37 cases) occurring within ten years after political independence. Examples for long-
lasting currency unions between sovereign nations include the link of the Irish pound to the 
British pound and the peg of the Malagasy franc to the French franc.
20 
Figures 3 and 4 present some case study evidence for economic measures for which I 
find significant differences between broken and sustained currency unions. Figure 3 focuses 
on the inflation differential; the figure provides 8 time-series plots of the difference in 
national inflation rates before (and immediately after) currency union dissolution (an event 
marked with a vertical line). As the graphs clearly show, broken currency unions tend to 
display considerable differences in consumer price inflation before exit, often sizably above 
the average for sustained currency unions (marked with a horizontal line). Further, it is mainly 
the country that leaves the union that experiences high inflation, often caused by severe fiscal 
imbalances. 
Figure 4 provides analogues for differences in import growth. Illustrating previous 
regression results, large differences in import growth often preceded currency union 
dissolutions, with especially the departing country experiencing a sometimes dramatic decline 
in trade. 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
unions primarily depends on the “political will”. However, while giving up a currency union 
is ultimately a political decision (as is the decision to establish or join a monetary union), my 
regression results show that economic issues are not completely irrelevant. 
20 Ireland departed from its sterling link in 1979, 58 years after independence from the United 
Kingdom. Madagascar was a member of the French franc zone from independence in 1960 
until 1973. After withdrawal in 1973, the Malagasy franc remained pegged to the French 
franc for another nine years until April 2, 1982.  
17Figure 2: Currency Union Dissolutions and Political Independence
Notes: The columns give the number of switches out of a currency union for the year after political
independence. The total sample comprises 69 currency union dissolutions; four of these exits involve
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18Figure 3: Inflation Differentials — Selected Country Pairs
United States — Dominican Rep. United Kingdom — Somalia Australia — Tonga Barbados — Trinidad & Tobago
Netherlands Antilles — Suriname Burma (Myanmar) — Pakistan Sri Lanka — India Cameroon — Madagascar
Notes: The graphs show the inflation differential for selected country pairs (circled line), the average inflation differential for sustained currency unions (horizontal line), and inflation rates for the country that 
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19Figure 4: Import Growth Differentials — Selected Country Pairs
United States — Guatemala United Kingdom — Gambia Portugal — Guinea-Bissau Guyana — Trinidad & Tobago
Bangladesh — India Burma (Myanmar) — Pakistan Congo, Rep. of — Mauritania Cote d'Ivoire — Madagascar
Notes: The graphs show the import growth differential for selected country pairs (circled line), the average import growth differential for sustained currency unions (horizontal line), and import growth for the country
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VI. Conclusions 
A growing number of countries actively considers to abandon its national currency and 
to enter a monetary union. The motives for the adoption of a foreign currency (which implies 
the loss of some national independence and sovereignty) range from the desire for closer 
economic integration to the introduction of external discipline. 
Since sharing a common currency involves not only benefits but also comes with some 
costs, much of the literature on currency unions focuses on the pros and cons of monetary 
integration; many empirical studies discuss this trade-off in the context of proposed monetary 
unions. 
In this paper, I follow another route. In particular, I search for stylized facts associated 
with the break-up of currency unions; a characterization of currency union exits allows to 
answer the question of when does a common currency link become unsustainable. I examine 
annual data for 245 country pairs that share the same money from 1948 through 1997. 
I find that a large inflation differential between currency union members is 
consistently associated with a high likelihood of a currency union dissolution; an obvious 
extension would be to search for potential causes of this divergence in inflation performance. 
Many departures from a currency union link also occurred when a political union is dissolved. 
Somewhat surprisingly, neither asymmetries in output nor fiscal variables matter for a typical 
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23Appendix: Currency Unions in Sample
# cu break Currency Union Members End # cu break Currency Union Members End
1 Antigua & Barbuda Dominica ongoing 56 Central African RepuCote d'Ivoire ongoing
2 Antigua & Barbuda Grenada ongoing 57 Central African RepuEquatorial Guinea ongoing
3 Antigua & Barbuda St. Vincent & the Greongoing 58 Central African RepuGabon ongoing
4 Aruba Netherlands Antilles ongoing 59 21 Central African RepuMadagascar 1982
5 Australia Kiribati ongoing 60 Central African RepuMali ongoing
6 Australia Nauru ongoing 61 Central African RepuNiger ongoing
7 1 Australia Solomon Islands 1979 62 Central African RepuSenegal ongoing
8 2 Australia Tonga 1991 63 Central African RepuTogo ongoing
9 Australia Tuvalu ongoing 64 Chad Benin ongoing
10 3 Bangladesh India 1974 65 Chad Burkina Faso ongoing
11 4 Barbados Grenada 1975 66 Chad Congo, Rep. of ongoing
12 5 Barbados Guyana 1971 67 Chad Cote d'Ivoire ongoing
13 6 Barbados Trinidad & Tobago 1975 68 Chad Gabon ongoing
14 7 Belgium-Luxembourg Congo, Dem. Rep. of 1961 69 22 Chad Madagascar 1982
15 8 Belgium-Luxembourg Rwanda 1966 70 Chad Niger ongoing
16 Benin Burkina Faso ongoing 71 Chad Senegal ongoing
17 Benin Cote d'Ivoire ongoing 72 Chad Togo ongoing
18 Benin Equatorial Guinea ongoing 73 23 Comoros Burkina Faso 1994
19 Benin Gabon ongoing 74 24 Comoros Cote d'Ivoire 1994
20 9 Benin Guinea 1969 75 25 Comoros Madagascar 1982
21 Benin Guinea-Bissau ongoing 76 26 Comoros Niger 1994
22 10 Benin Madagascar 1982 77 27 Comoros Reunion 1976
23 Benin Mali ongoing 78 28 Comoros Senegal 1994
24 11 Benin Mauritania 1974 79 Congo, Rep. of Benin ongoing
25 Benin Niger ongoing 80 Congo, Rep. of Burkina Faso ongoing
26 12 Benin Reunion 1976 81 Congo, Rep. of Cote d'Ivoire ongoing
27 Benin Senegal ongoing 82 Congo, Rep. of Gabon ongoing
28 Benin Togo ongoing 83 29 Congo, Rep. of Madagascar 1982
29 Bhutan India ongoing 84 Congo, Rep. of Mali ongoing
30 13 Brunei Darussalam Malaysia 1971 85 30 Congo, Rep. of Mauritania 1974
31 Brunei Darussalam Singapore ongoing 86 Congo, Rep. of Niger ongoing
32 14 Burma (Myanmar) India 1966 87 31 Congo, Rep. of Reunion 1976
33 15 Burma (Myanmar) Pakistan 1971 88 Congo, Rep. of Senegal ongoing
34 Cameroon Benin ongoing 89 Congo, Rep. of Togo ongoing
35 Cameroon Burkina Faso ongoing 90 Cote d'Ivoire Burkina Faso ongoing
36 Cameroon Central African Repuongoing 91 32 Cote d'Ivoire Madagascar 1982
37 Cameroon Chad ongoing 92 33 Cote d'Ivoire Mali 1962/ong.
38 16 Cameroon Comoros 1994 93 34 Cote d'Ivoire Mauritania 1974
39 Cameroon Congo, Rep. of ongoing 94 Cote d'Ivoire Niger ongoing
40 Cameroon Cote d'Ivoire ongoing 95 35 Cote d'Ivoire Reunion 1976
41 Cameroon Equatorial Guinea ongoing 96 Cote d'Ivoire Senegal ongoing
42 Cameroon Gabon ongoing 97 Cote d'Ivoire Togo ongoing
43 17 Cameroon Guinea 1969 98 Denmark Faeroe Islands ongoing
44 Cameroon Guinea-Bissau ongoing 99 Denmark Greenland ongoing
45 18 Cameroon Madagascar 1982 100 36 Djibouti Madagascar 1949
46 Cameroon Mali ongoing 101 Dominica Grenada ongoing
47 19 Cameroon Mauritania 1974 102 Dominica Montserrat ongoing
48 Cameroon Niger ongoing 103 Dominica St. Kitts & Nevis ongoing
49 Cameroon Senegal ongoing 104 Dominica St. Lucia ongoing
50 Cameroon Togo ongoing 105 Dominica St. Vincent & the Greongoing
51 Central African RepuBenin ongoing 106 Equatorial Guinea Burkina Faso ongoing
52 Central African RepuBurkina Faso ongoing 107 Equatorial Guinea Cote d'Ivoire ongoing
53 Central African RepuChad ongoing 108 Equatorial Guinea Mali ongoing
54 20 Central African RepuComoros 1994 109 Equatorial Guinea Senegal ongoing
55 Central African RepuCongo, Rep. of ongoing 110 Equatorial Guinea Togo ongoing
24111 37 France Algeria 1969 166 Mali Senegal ongoing
112 France French Guiana ongoing 167 Mali Togo ongoing
113 France Guadeloupe ongoing 168 71 Mauritania Niger 1974
114 France Martinique ongoing 169 72 Mauritania Senegal 1974
115 38 France Morocco 1959 170 73 Mauritania Togo 1974
116 France Reunion ongoing 171 74 Mauritius Seychelles 1976
117 France St. Pierre & Miquelonongoing 172 Montserrat St. Vincent & the Greongoing
118 39 France Tunisia 1958 173 75 Netherlands Antilles Suriname 1994
119 Gabon Burkina Faso ongoing 174 New Caledonia French Polynesia ongoing
120 Gabon Cote d'Ivoire ongoing 175 76 New Caledonia Vanuatu 1971
121 40 Gabon Guinea 1969 176 New Caledonia Wallis & Futuna ongoing
122 41 Gabon Madagascar 1982 177 77 New Zealand Samoa 1967
123 Gabon Mali ongoing 178 Niger Burkina Faso ongoing
124 42 Gabon Mauritania 1974 179 Niger Senegal ongoing
125 Gabon Niger ongoing 180 Niger Togo ongoing
126 43 Gabon Reunion 1976 181 78 Nigeria Sierra Leone 1965
127 Gabon Senegal ongoing 182 79 Oman India 1970
128 Gabon Togo ongoing 183 80 Pakistan Mauritius 1967
129 44 Gambia Ghana 1965 184 81 Portugal Angola 1976
130 45 Gambia Nigeria 1967 185 82 Portugal Cape Verde 1977
131 46 Gambia Sierra Leone 1965 186 83 Portugal Guinea-Bissau 1977
132 47 Ghana Nigeria 1965 187 84 Portugal Mozambique 1977
133 48 Ghana Sierra Leone 1965 188 85 Portugal Sao Tome & Principe 1977
134 49 Grenada Guyana 1971 189 86 Qatar India 1966
135 Grenada Montserrat ongoing 190 Qatar United Arab Emiratesongoing
136 Grenada St. Kitts & Nevis ongoing 191 87 Reunion Burkina Faso 1976
137 Grenada St. Lucia ongoing 192 88 Reunion Senegal 1976
138 Grenada St. Vincent & the Greongoing 193 Senegal Burkina Faso ongoing
139 50 Grenada Trinidad & Tobago 1976 194 Senegal Togo ongoing
140 51 Guinea Cote d'Ivoire 1969 195 89 Somalia Tanzania 1971
141 52 Guinea Mali 1962 196 90 Somalia Uganda 1971
142 53 Guinea Mauritania 1969 197 91 Sri Lanka India 1966
143 54 Guinea Senegal 1969 198 92 Sri Lanka Pakistan 1967
144 Guinea-Bissau Burkina Faso ongoing 199 St. Kitts & Nevis St. Vincent & the Greongoing
145 Guinea-Bissau Cote d'Ivoire ongoing 200 93 St. Pierre & MiquelonCote d'Ivoire 1976
146 Guinea-Bissau Senegal ongoing 201 94 St. Pierre & MiquelonGabon 1976
147 Guinea-Bissau Togo ongoing 202 95 St. Pierre & MiquelonReunion 1976
148 55 India Mauritius 1966 203 96 St. Pierre & MiquelonTogo 1976
149 56 India Pakistan 1966 204 St. Lucia St. Vincent & the Greongoing
150 57 Kenya Somalia 1971 205 97 Tanzania Uganda 1978
151 58 Kenya Tanzania 1978 206 Togo Burkina Faso ongoing
152 59 Kenya Uganda 1978 207 98 United Kingdom Bahamas 1966
153 60 Kuwait India 1961 208 99 United Kingdom Bermuda 1970
154 61 Madagascar Burkina Faso 1982 209 100 United Kingdom Cyprus 1972
155 62 Madagascar Mauritania 1974 210 United Kingdom Falkland Islands ongoing
156 63 Madagascar Niger 1982 211 101 United Kingdom Gambia 1971
157 64 Madagascar Reunion 1976 212 102 United Kingdom Ghana 1965
158 65 Madagascar Senegal 1982 213 United Kingdom Gibraltar ongoing
159 66 Madagascar Togo 1982 214 103 United Kingdom Iraq 1967
160 67 Malawi Zambia 1967 215 104 United Kingdom Ireland 1979
161 68 Malawi Zimbabwe 1967 216 105 United Kingdom Israel 1954
162 69 Malaysia Singapore 1971 217 106 United Kingdom Jamaica 1969
163 70 Maldives Pakistan 1971 218 107 United Kingdom Jordan 1967
164 Mali Burkina Faso ongoing 219 108 United Kingdom Kenya 1967
165 Mali Niger ongoing 220 109 United Kingdom Kuwait 1967
25221 110 United Kingdom Libya 1967
222 111 United Kingdom Malawi 1971
223 112 United Kingdom Malta 1971
224 113 United Kingdom New Zealand 1967
225 114 United Kingdom Nigeria 1967
226 115 United Kingdom Oman 1971
227 116 United Kingdom Samoa 1967
228 117 United Kingdom Sierra Leone 1965
229 118 United Kingdom Somalia 1967
230 119 United Kingdom South Africa 1961
231 United Kingdom St. Helena ongoing
232 120 United Kingdom Tanzania 1967
233 121 United Kingdom Uganda 1967
234 122 United Kingdom Yemen 1972
235 123 United Kingdom Zambia 1967
236 124 United Kingdom Zimbabwe 1967
237 United States Bahamas ongoing
238 United States Bermuda ongoing
239 125 United States Dominican Republic 1985
240 United States Guam ongoing
241 126 United States Guatemala 1986
242 United States Liberia ongoing
243 United States Panama ongoing
244 127 Vanuatu French Polynesia 1971
245 128 Zimbabwe Zambia 1967
26 
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